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§1981

standard, the real need is for direct means of minority advancement. If
Congress fails to repeal any section 1981 effect on affirmative action, the
Court should acknowledge the logical difficulties with its interpretation of
the statute and resolve not to extend what is essentially the Court's own
creation to invalidate society's attempts to correct its past errors.
KENDALL COFFEY

ESTABLISHING NEW CRITERIA FOR CONFLICT CERTIORARI IN
PER CURIAM DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS: A FIRST STEP
TOWARD A DEFINITION OF POWER
Article V of the Florida Constitution gives the supreme court power to
grant a writ of certiorari when "a decision by a district court is in direct
conflict with a decision of any district court of appeals or of the supreme
court on the same point of law."1 For almost two decades the Supreme Court
of Florida has struggled to delimit its conflict jurisdiction. The limits are
especially unclear when the alleged conflict is based upon per curiam decisions 2 rendered by the district courts of appeal. The present procedure for
dealing with per curiam district court decisions is to examine the "record
proper"3 of lower court proceedings to determine if conflict jurisdiction
1. FLA. CONST. art. V, §8(b)(3). In Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731, 784
(Fla. 1960), the supreme court held that the conflict comprehended by art. V, §3(b)(3) can
be found (1) where an announced rule of law conflicts with other appellate expressions
of law, or (2) where a rule of law is applied to produce a different result in a case
which involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case. For a recent
application of this formulation see the City of Jacksonville v. First Nat'l. Bank of Jacksonville, 389 So. 2d 632, 688 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concurring).
2. "By the Court. A phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from
an opinion of one judge." BLACK'S LAw DicnoNwaY 1293 (4th ed. 1951). Though per
curiam is the traditional phraseology, Justice England, in recent cases has referred to
per curiam decisions as decisions "by the court." See State v. Johnson, 586 So. 2d 1131
(Fla. 1976); State v. Adams, 85 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1976). The First District Court of Appeal
has adopted Justice England's "by the Court" terminology. Dixon v. State, 884 So. 2d 822
(1st D.CA. Fla. 1976); Tuten v. State, 884 So. 2d 822 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1976); Watson v.
State, 84 So. 2d 281 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1976); Rutledge v. State, 334 So. 2d 821 (1st D.CA.
Fla. 1976). The other District Courts of Appeal, however, are clinging to the traditional
per curiam designation. See Copeland v. State, 86 So. 2d 653 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1976); Santos
v. Bosh, 384 So. 2d 888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1976), Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 854
So. 2d 826 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1976).
8. The term "record proper" first appeared in Florida in Foley v. Weaver Drugs,
177 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1965). Indigenous to Florida law in this context, the term was
specifically established to provide the court with a portion of the record below for
determining whether a conflict existed in the absence of a district court opinion. For an
examination of the traditional use of record proper in other court systems, see Justice
Overton's dissent in Baycol v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 815 So. 2d 451, 459 (Fla. 1975). For
further historical background and analysis of the term record proper see Note, Conflict
CertiorariJurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: The Record Proper, 8 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 409 (1975).
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exists. Several constitutional and practical questions have arisen from this
procedure.
It is unsettled whether the Article V provision for harmonizing conflicts
in the laws of the state includes the power to review district court decisions
without opinion through examination of the record proper. Even if such a
power exists, it is questionable whether state law can be effectively harmonized
by this type of review, which requires the supreme court to second guess
the rationale for lower court decisions. Also unsettled is what comprises the
record proper for purposes of conflict jurisdiction. Because the present
procedure regarding per curiam district court decisions appears to violate
Article V, it not only presents the possibility of eroding the finality of the
district courts' appellate jurisdiction, 4 but also threatens the ability of the
supreme court effectively to fulfill its role as a court of limited supervisory
jurisdiction concerned with only the most critical areas of constitutional
5
and appellate review.
There is a great need for the supreme court to develop a consistent
policy of reviewing district court decisions without opinions. In this policy
the court must continually balance its jurisdiction in order to maintain uniformity in law with final appellate jurisdiction delegated to the district
courts of appeal. This commentary examines the balancing process by tracing
the background of the supreme court's power to dispose of per curiam
district court decisions and by describing the two positions held by the Florida
supreme court since the creation of conflict jurisdiction. The constitutional
and practical problems in the present system are pointed out, and a solution
with a potential for striking the necessary balance is offered.
BACKGROUND

Prior to the 1957 amendment of Article V of the Florida Constitution,,
the supreme court could exercise its final appellate jurisdiction by issuing a
common law writ of certiorari.7 The common law writ, which was purely
discretionary, 8 was issued to any inferior court "where necessary for the
attainment of Justice."9 In 1957, the electorate adopted a constitutional
amendment to Article V that was designed to improve a congested court
system by reallocating judicial powers.' 0 The amendment transferred final

4. FLA. CONST. art. V, §4(b). For an analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court of
Florida's extensions of jurisdiction immediately after Foley v. Weaver Drugs see Note,
Erosion of the Final Jurisdiction of Florida'sDistrict Courts of Appeal, 21 U. FLA. L. REv.
375 (1969).
5. Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958).
6. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §4(2) was adopted on November 6, 1956, and went into effect
on July 1, 1957. This section became §3(b)(3) in 1972. Fla. Laws 1972, S.J. Res. 52-D, §3,
at 99.
7. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Mack, 64 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 1952); Brinson v. Tharin, 99
Fla. 696, 127 So. 313 (1930); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Ray, 52 Fla. 634, 42 So. 714 (1906).
8. Lorenzo v. Murphy, 159 Fla. 639, 645, 32 So. 2d 421, 424 (1947).
9. Halliday v. Jacksonville and Alligator Plank Rd. Co., 6 Fla. 304, 305 (1855).
10. Lake v. Lake, 108 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
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appellate jurisdiction in most cases to district courts of appeal." To complete
the streamlining of the judiciary, the supreme court was given a supervisory
role.' 2 The supreme court is now empowered to entertain only a limited
class of cases on appeal 3 and to grant certiorari only if a case affects a class
of constitutional or state officers, passes upon a question certified by the
district court to be of great public interest, or conflicts directly with a
decision of any district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same
point of law.' 4 This commentary focuses on the use of the third category,
commonly referred to as conflict certiorari, in cases where the district court
5
has rendered a decision without opinion.'
The primary purposes of the new Article V's conflict certiorari provision
were to allow the supreme court to maintain harmony among the newly
created district courts of appeal and to promote uniformity in the laws of
the state.' 6 The conflict certiorari provision was a legislative recognition that
the need for final appellate jurisdiction to be vested in several diverse district
courts must be balanced by a final authority with limited jurisdiction to
resolve inter-district conflicts."7 In defining the limits of this conflict jurisdiction the 1958 supreme court was quickly confronted with a jurisdictional
Pandora's box. Still unanswered questions included whether the new Article
V contemplated the supreme court's extending conflict jurisdiction to district
court decisions without opinion and whether such a per curiam disposition
could provide the supreme court with a basis for harmonizing the laws of
the state.
11. Id. at 642. See generally Short v. Grossman, 245 So. 2d 217, 219-20 (Fla. 1971); Zinn
v. Pfizer & Co., 128 So. 2d 594, 597 (Fla. 1961).
12. Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1968).
13. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, §3(b)(l), (2).
14. FLA. CONsT. art. V, §3(b)(3). There are also specific provisions for interlocutory
orders passing on a matter which upon judgment would be directly appealable. FLA.
CONsT. art. V, §3(b)(l), (2). In addition, there has traditionally been a certiorari vehicle
for reviewing orders of state administrative boards and commissions. F.A.R. 4.1. But see
FLA. STAT. §120.68 (1975). For an explanation that might resolve the apparent contradiction
between the rule and the statute see Haddad, The Common Law Writ of Certiorari in
Florida, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 222 (1977).

15. For a good general evaluation of the Florida supreme court's use of the writ of
certiorari see Hayes, CertiorariReview of District Court of Appeal Decisions by the Supreme
Court, 28 U. Mux L. REv. 952 (1974). For thorough evaluation of the extraordinary writ
of common law certiorari see Haddad, supra note 14.
16. AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975); Foley v. Weaver Drugs, 177 So. 2d
221, 224 (Fla. 1965); N&L Auto Parts Co. v. Danan, 117 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1960); Lake
v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642-43 (Fla. 1958); Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 810

(Fla. 1958).
17. Justice Thomas, who was instrumental in the creation of the district courts of
appeal, reiterated in several speeches favoring ratification of this constitutional amendment
that conflict certiorari would be granted only in extreme cases where irreconcilable conflicts between state courts existed. Thomas stressed that in most cases the district courts
of appeal would be courts of final appellate jurisdiction on the merits; litigants would
not be faced with the long trek to Tallahassee for final disposition of their cases. Interview with Chief Justice Ben Overton, Supreme Court of Florida, in Tallahassee, Fla.
(October 13, 1975).
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Lake v. Lake
The supreme court attempted to resolve some of the uncertainty surrounding conflict certiorari in Lake v. Lake,'8 in which the petitioner urged the
court to grant review of per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal.
The application for certiorari was based on petitioner's claim that the Second
District Court of Appeal's per curiam decision- 9 affirming the circuit court's
findings was factually similar to a case in which the supreme court had reached
an opposite result. 20 Rejecting petitioner's contention, Justice Thomas, writing
for the majority, pointed to the difficulty of harmonizing contrary district
court decisions without an opinion to serve as a rational basis for reconciling
the conflict. 2' The court's position was strongly influenced by the legislative
intent behind the amendment of Article V.22 The primary purpose of the
amendment was to relieve a congested court system by establishing the
district courts and at the same time to retain statewide uniformity of judicial
decisions. 23 Within these constitutional bounds the court impliedly defined
Article V's use of the word "decision" as a basis for conflict to include both
24
the judgment and the opinion.
The Lake court outlined the requirements for a successful application
for conflict certiorari.
If in a particular case an opinion is rendered by a district court of
appeal that prima facie conflicts with a decision of another district
court of appeal or Supreme Court on some point of law, the writ of
certiorari may issue and, after study, may be discharged, or the
or modified
decision of the district court of appeal may be quashed
5
to the end that any conflict may be reconciled.2
The alternative procedure would compel the supreme court to "dig through
the record of the case to determine if the conflict alleged by the petitioner's
interpretation of former decisions existed." 26 Rejecting this alternative, Justice
Thomas foresaw two dangers in extending supreme court review to include
conflicts based on per curiam decisions. First, finding conflict by review of
the record without opinion could not adequately satisfy the constitutional
18. 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 19513).
19. 98 So. 2d 761 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
20. Dye v. Dulbeck, 114 Fla. 866, 154 So. 847 (1934).
21. 103 So. 2d at 643. See also, Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970); Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, 177 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1965).
22. 103 So. 2d at 640-41.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 643. A short time after the court's decision in Lake, in their only decision
speaking directly on this point, the supreme court explained the need for a unique
definition of "decision" in Florida. Because of the unusual structure of the Florida
courts and the limited powers of review of the Florida supreme court under the revised
Florida Constitution, the court held that the constitutional definition of decision "comprehends both the opinion and the judgment." Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Brahman,
104 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1958).
25. 103 So. 2d at 643.
26. Id. at 641.
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goal of harmonizing the laws of the state.2 7 The philosophy of conflict
certiorari was not to provide an individual with a second appeal due to
some harmless or miniscule conflict; only if the conflict threatened to over2
turn an established body of law could the court exercise jurisdiction. The
Lake court determined that such a clear conflict could only be revealed in a
decision accompanied by the compelling reasoning of a district court formulated in an opinion.29 Second, this extension of review to determine whether
the court has jurisdiction would certainly destroy the final appellate nature
of the district courts' appellate jurisdiction. Giving the court authority to
dig through the record would permit an unlimited review process that
would ultimately make the district courts of appeal little more than "waystations to the Supreme Court,"30 a position contrary to their constitutional
role. Nevertheless, although generally closing the door on an extension of
supreme court conflict jurisdiction to review district court decisions without
opinion, Justice Thomas conceded the need for exceptions to the Lake rule.
There may be exceptions to the rule that this court will not go
behind a judgment per curiam, consisting only of the word "affirmed"
which does not reflect a decision that would interfere with settled
.Conprinciples of law, rendered by a district court of appeal .....
ceivably it could appear from the restricted examination required in
proceedings in certiorari that a conflict had arisen with resulting injustice to the immediate litigant. In that event the exception, not the
rule, would apply. But if the Supreme Court undertakes to go behind
a judgment on the tenuous theory that it must see that justice is done
instead of giving to the judgment the verity it deserves and assuming
that justice has been done the system that has been overwhelmingly
approved by the people will be undermined and weakened. 31

27. Id.at 643.

28. Justice Thomas did not want to see the supreme court become a vehicle for a
second appeal on the merits. He felt the supreme court should not intervene on the
basis of mistake or error, but was empowered to intervene only .if the conflict presented a
serious threat to the uniformity of state laws. Further, Justice Thomas believed it unnecessary
for the court to spend its time remedying every conflict. Article V, §3(b)(3) of the
Florida Constitution provides that the court "may" grant a writ of certiorari. A writ of
conflict certiorari is therefore a writ of grace to be exercised sparingly within constitutional demands. For a reappearance of Justice Thomas' view in recent supreme court
opinions (most of them dissenting opinions of Justice England or Justice Overton) see
Carter v. State, 331 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1976); Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134, 137
(Fla. 1976); Hunt v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 327 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1976); Hollywood
Beach Co. v. City of Hollywood, 321 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1976).
29. The precedential value of per curiam district court decision is minimal. They

cannot usually be found by "shepardizing." Even if found, without the reasoning of
the court to apply to the facts at hand, per curiam decisions add little strength to an
argument. See text accompanying notes 44-49 infra.
30. 103 So. 2d at 641. Justice Thomas was very concerned with a loss of faith in the

finality of appellate decisions made by the district courts of appeal. He felt the
entire rationale for establishing district courts would be defeated if litigants began to

feel their final right to appeal rested in the supreme court, See also Note, supra note 4,
31.

103 So. 2d at 643.
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It was this exception to the Lake rule that became its death knell in Foley
32
v. Weaver Drugs.
Foley v. Weaver Drugs
The supreme court experienced difficulty in following the Lake rule for
disposing of per curiam judgments in the conflict certiorari area. Increasingly,
advocates applying for a writ of certiorari sought to classify their clients
within the Lake exception by urging review of the record to "prevent injustice to the immediate litigant."' 33 As a result, the court was continually
faced with the task of examining the record to determine if a conflict existed
within the exception.

34

The court at times attempted to maintain consistency with Lake by remanding the case to the district court with instructions to write an opinion
clarifying the conflict s But in 1965, the Third District Court of Appeal in
Foley v. Weaver Drugs refused the supreme court's request for an opinion.3 6
The Lake rule placed the court in a dilemma: it could either abolish the
Lake exception and refuse certiorari if the district court disposed of a case
per curiam or transform the exception into the rule by extending supreme
court review of the record to all per curiam district court decisions to determine whether a conflict existed.
Writing for the majority in Foley, Justice Roberts first pointed to the
shortcomings of the Lake exception for resolving the question of whether
the court should entertain per curiam decisions.3 7 Next, Justice Roberts
emphasized that a decision without opinion fulfills the constitutional definition of "decision":
Nor is there any legal distinction between the effect of a per curiam
decision without opinion, and one that is supported by an opinion, so
that one is not entitled to and should not be given more "verity"
than the other. It is the judgment that constitutes the decision.32. 177 So. 2d at 221.
33. E.g., South Fla. Hosp. Co. v. McCrea, 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960); Dean v. Deas,
116 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 1959).
34. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, 177 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1965).
35. E.g., Svedeker v. Vernman, Ltd., 139 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1962); Rosenthal v. Scott,
131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961); State v. Bruno, 104 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1958).
36. 177 So. 2d at 221. Later in the opinion, the court stated that it could exercise
its rule-making authority to require district courts to write an opinion. Id. at 226. It is
unclear, however, especially in light of the workload at the district court level, whether
such a rule could force the district courts to write opinions that would aid the supreme
court in determining whether to exercise its conflict jurisdiction.
37. Id. at 223.

38. Id. at 224. Justice Roberts referred to the court's analysis of per curiam decisions
in Newman v. Lake Worth Drainage, 87 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1956). This case contained an
analysis of the impact of per curiam decisions by the Florida supreme court prior to the
1957 amendment restricting the supreme court's jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 6
supra. It is questionable whether this definition is automatically applicable to per curiam

decisions of the district courts. Although they were allocated a portion of the supreme
court's authority under the old constitutional provision, the practical considerations of
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Finally, Justice Roberts relied on two United States Supreme Court decisions
that expressed the need for clarifying ambiguities and obscurities in state
law for the proper exercise of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 9
These considerations led the Florida supreme court to overrule Lake and to
adopt a compromise position 0 providing for review of per curiam decisions
via the record proper to determine whether a conflict existed.41
Justice Thornal, joined by two other members of the court, filed a forceful dissent echoing Justice Thomas' warnings in Lake of the consequences
of expanded supreme court review. The dissenters recognized a two-fold
threat stemming from the adoption of the Foley doctrine. First, the uniformity
of the laws of the state would be adversely affected by a failure of the supreme
court adequately to harmonize the decisions of state courts on the basis
of the word "affirmed" and the record proper. 42 Second, final appellate jurisdiction of the district courts of appeal would be eroded by the power of the
the new constitution's conflict certiorari provision meant that the supreme court would
have to review constantly alleged conflicts in district court opinions. Justice Roberts' analogy
falls short because a per curiam decision of a district court may be utilized by the
supreme court in harmonizing the laws of the state, a function that per curiam decisions
of the supreme court prior to 1957 were never designed to perform. In further explaining
the verity to be given a per curiam decision of a district court, Justice Roberts also
relied on Justice Hobson's dissenting opinion in Donohue v. Beeler, 149 So. 2d 534, 536
(Fla. 1963). But neither Justice Roberts nor Justice Hobson explained how a per
curiam decision can provide the court with the reasoning and jurisprudence of various
conflicting courts' views needed to harmonize effectively the laws of the state. At best,
rummaging through the lower court record and reading the briefs might allow the
court to reconstruct some of the proceedings below. Finally, Justice Roberts did not
respond to the court's holding in Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Brahman, 104 So. 2d 356, 358
(Fla. 1958), in which the court said that article V's definition of "decision" comprehends
both the judgment and the opinion. See note 25 supra.
39. Justice Roberts implied a belief that the United States Supreme Court was
speaking directly to the Florida supreme court in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S.
551 (1939). It was his view that the Supreme Court of Florida should clear up any ambiguities in the state's law. This view disregarded the limited appellate jurisdiction
vested in the Supreme Court of Florida in the post-1957 version of article V of the Florida
Constitution. National Tea Co. and Blackburn v. Alabama, 354 U.S. 393 (1956), the cases
relied upon by Justice Roberts, can be viewed in another way. The United States
Supreme Court might have meant that it cannot properly exercise appellate jurisdiction
unless an unambiguous issue is presented for decision and that any appellate court in
a similar position should wait for further clarity before performing its appellate function.
This view is born out by the language in the cases and the results. In both cases the
Supreme Court denied certiorari, remanding for clarification before exercising appellate
jurisdiction. By analogy, perhaps, the Florida supreme court should not grant a writ of
conflict certiorari without having a clear and unambiguous issue in conflict. This view
would make it extremely difficult for per curiam district court decisions to serve as a
basis for conflict certiorari except in cases of the most blatant conflicts.
40. Justice Roberts called the court's 4-3 decision in Foley a compromise, a temporary
settlement of the per curiam district court decision problem. Interview with Justice
B. K. Roberts, Supreme Court of Florida, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Oct. 13, 1975). Perhaps after
a decade this compromise has now outlived its usefulness. See AB OTC v. Morejon, 324
So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. 1975) (England, J., dissenting).
41. 177 So. 2d at 225.
42. Id. at 231.
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supreme court to grant a second appeal in any case through conflict jurisdic43
tion based on examination of the record proper.
THE

Foley

AFTERMATH: UNSETTLED CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL QUESTIONS

Several constitutional considerations support the view that the supreme
court cannot harmonize directly conflicting decisions on the same point of
law without an adequate consideration of both the legal reasoning and
case law authority relied on by the district court. The basic philosophy of
review by conflict certiorari is to resolve irreconcilable district court decisions
in extreme cases.- This limited remedy is to be applied only when conflict
threatens the uniformity of state law.45 In these important cases, effective
communication between the district courts in dispute and the supreme court
is criticial in formulating the law of the state. Effective communication
excludes communication solely by counsel's implication of what the district
court meant in a brief for jurisdiction or communication based on the
inferences drawn by the justices as to the meaning of the district court's
decision.46 More importantly, it is unclear whether the Constitution authorizes
the court to search through the record proper to determine if conflict exists.
As noted in Foley, "it is utterly impossible to locate anything in the Constitution that conveys to the Supreme Court the privilege of exploring trial
records in order to produce conflict of decision. ' ' 4 Finally, it is doubtful
that the word "affirmed" can meaningfully establish direct conflict in decisions on a point of law. 43 The only case directly confronting the definition
of the word "decision" casts doubt on the value of per curiam decisions in
establishing a clear conflict by defining the term to comprehend both judgment and opinion. 49 Furthermore, even the Foley majority conceded that
an opinion once written becomes a part of the decision. 50 There can thus be
little doubt of the value of written opinions in resolving or explaining a
point of law.
Beyond these unsettled constitutional challenges, the court's standard
of review as adopted in Foley, "examination of record proper of the courts
43. Id. at 234. For a discussion of the erosion of district
to and immediately after Foley, see Note, supra note 4.
44. See note 16 supra.

court

authority prior

45. Id.
46. Under the present system, the Supreme Court of Florida does not communicate
with the district courts in conflict except occasionally to ask for conformed transcripts
and the record used by the district courts in announcing their opinions. The entire
responsibility for establishing and arguing conflict is on petitioner's counsel; the court
relies heavily on counsel because it has little knowledge of the proceedings below. Interview with Chief Justice Ben Overton, Supreme Court of Florida, in Tallahassee, Fla.
(November 3, 1975).
47. 177 So. 2d at 234.
48. Id. at 231. In the words of Justice Thornal, "How can one word 'affirmed' be a
'decision on the same point of law? If it can be, what 'point of law' does the word
'affirmed' decide?" Id. For a contemporary application of Justice Thornal's analysis see
Golden Loaf Baking Co. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585, 586-87 (Fla. 1976).
49. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
50. Zinn v. Pfizer, 128 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1961),
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below," 51 has proved unworkable. Three major problems have resulted from
the application of the Foley standard. First, the district courts are often
circumvented in determining a basis for harmonizing the laws of the state. In
addition, applicants for writs of certiorari are overloading the court with
increasing numbers of petitions accompanied by voluminous pages of record
proper alleged to be necessary to establish conflict. Finally, the supreme
court's expansion of its conflict jurisdiction through examination of the
record proper has diminished the final appellate authority vested in the
district courts by the Constitution.
As noted above, the present conflict certiorari procedure has no significant
provision for communication between the supreme court and a district court
proffering its decision without opinion on the point of law alleged to be in
conflict. 52 When the supreme court examines the record proper, it can only
speculate as to the legal issues and theories supporting a per curiam district
court decision. 53 The court has nothing on which to base its decision beyond
that which the litigants allege to be the reasoning of the district court. Often,
the district courts are totally unaware that their decisions without opinion
conflict with a body of law within the state.M Traditionally, per curiam
decisions indicated that the judges were of one mind and were usually
reserved for expeditiously dealing with well-settled points of law.5 5 When a
district court is unaware that its decision conflicts with prior case law, the
supreme court's second guessing of that decision by probing the record can
only lead to a relitigation of the question, entailing supreme court reclarification when the district court again faces similar facts and issues and formulates
an opinion. 56 Regrettably, Foley-type harmonization provides no chance for
the district courts upon whose decisions review is based to respond to the
alleged existence of a conflicting point of law. There should at the very
least be a provision in the certiorari process allowing the district courts
to certify relevant facts to the supreme court for examination in determining
5
whether a conflict exists and as an aid in resolving that conflict. 7
Present trends-8 in conflict certiorari demonstrate that examination of
the record proper is absorbing increasingly greater amounts of the supreme
court's time. 59 Out of 138 writs of certiorari granted in 1974, 128 were for
51. 177 So. 2d at 225.
52. See note 46 supra.
53. See note 39 supra.
54. Under the present procedure the alleged conflict need not have been presented
to the district court in any form; the cases relied on for conflict can first be presented
at the supreme court level. Interview with Justice A. England, Supreme Court of Florida,
in Tallahassee, Fla. (October 13, 1975).
55. Id. See also, BLACK'S LAW DicnoNARY 1293 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
56. AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. 1975).
57. See text accompanying notes 115-118 infra.
58. The author has analyzed in detail Florida supreme court review by certiorari.
This study entailed a file by fie examination of the 138 cases in which certiorari was
granted by the Florida supreme court in 1974-1975. Much thanks and appreciation is
due the Clerk of the supreme Court Sid White and very helpful staff. Thanks also goes
out to Colonel Core of the Judicial Advisory Committee.
59. In 1970-1971 the supreme court heard 589 petitions for certiorari; in 1973-1974
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conflict certiorari. A little over one third of the petitions granted were based
on per curiam dispositions at the district court level. 60 The number of judicial
hours needed to process petitions for conflict certiorari is exacerbated by the
substantial contents of the petitions and the briefs for jurisdiction. 61 The
contents of the record and the time needed for examination are inevitably
greater in cases of per curiam disposition by the district courts than in cases
with opinions because the record becomes the basis for determining if a
conflict exists.62 Petitions and briefs for jurisdiction have included voluminous
documentation often presented in a massive appendix, or in conformed
transcripts, with a general index. 63 The litigant's philosophy seems to be
that if the court is provided with an ample record it will engage in a fishing
expedition to determine if a conflict exists. 6 4 Such a philosophy is inconsistent
the court heard 857 petitions. In 1975, the court heard 986 petitions. From 1970-1975, therefore, there has been an increase by almost 50% in the number of petitions heard. See
Justice Thornal's analysis and prediction of this trend in Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d
823, 824 (Fla. 1970).
60. This observation is based on the author's examination of the 138 files as described
in note 59 supra.
61. Out of 138 files of cases in which certiorari was granted, two thirds of the
petitions for certiorari and briefs for jurisdiction contained excessive amounts of supplementary material in the form of an appendix or record for certiorari. Only in rare
cases did petitioner specifically designate portions of the record that were especially
relevant for the court to consider. It is possible that this problem might be partially
alleviated by the proposed F.A.R. 9.280(d), which merges the petition for certiorari and
the brief for jurisdiction. Draft, Proposed Florida Appellate Rules (Florida Rules Revision
Committee, Jan. 1976).
62. The author also detesrnined from an examination of the files that per curiam
cases offered as a basis for appeal in 1974-1975 usually contained more unrelated information in the record. Note 63 infra reflects information derived from the files of the cases
rather than from the report oE the cases.
63. Documentation has included complete transcripts of the trial at the circuit court,
Mancini v. State, 312 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975); transcripts of special hearings, Parkway
Towers Condominium v. Metro Dade Co., 295 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1974); pages of city
ordinances, Albury v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 295 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1974); copies of
all 28 exhibits and depositions used at trial, School Board v. Hauser, 293 So. 2d 681 (Fla.
1974); transcripts of entire secret proceedings before a psychologist, Keller v. Keller, 308
So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975); five district court opinions in their entirety, Densmore v. Martin
Blumenthal Ass'n., 314 So. 2d 756 (1975); a resolution of a city commission, Brigham v.
Dade County, 305 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1974); discussion of jury instructions in judge's
chambers, Perrett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 299 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1974); and briefs
of petitioner at district court level, 305 So. 2d 756; McGough v. State, 302 So. 2d 75 (Fla.
1974); State v. Gaugus, Supreme Court Case 45,171 (Fla. 1974) (this case does not appear
in reports because it was withdrawn before final disposition).
64. Though all the material contained in the record and briefs in the cases described
in note 64-73 supra was not irrelevant for determining conflict, in most cases it was
presented in an excessive and poorly organized format. This is part of a fishing expedition
philosophy. The inclusion of a massive amount of material in an appellate record or
appendix has two reasons: 1) to force the court to read hundreds of pages in the
hope that after the court has invested a great deal of time it will decide to hear oral
arguments or write an opinion; 2) by providing excess material for the court to peruse,
some point, perhaps a point not even based in the conflict, might catch the eye of four
justices who will issue the writ because they disagree with the decision of the district
court, or want a chance to speak on this matter regardless of the limited jurisdiction
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with the provision of the appellate rules that specifies "only that portion of
the record necessary to establish jurisdiction will be submitted."6 5
In addition to circumventing the jurisdiction of the district courts and
increasing the supreme court's workload, the concept of record proper
originating in Foley has given rise to an extension of supreme court jurisdiction beyond the intended grant of power from Article V of the Constitution.
The new Article V created district courts of appeal vested with final appellate
jurisdiction in most cases. 66 The debilitating effect of the Foley doctrine on
the district courts' final appellate jurisdiction has resulted from the burgeoning
definition of record proper since Foley.
In Foley, Justice Roberts defined record proper for the purpose of reviewing per curiam decisions of the district courts to determine whether a conflict
existed: "In each of such cases, some members of the court have examined
the 'record proper'-meaning the written record of the proceedings in the
Court under review except the testimony."6 7 Record proper has proven to
be an elastic concept capable of expanding to include forms and incidents of
litigation far beyond the restrictive definition placed on it by the Foley
court.
The supreme court's new definition of record proper includes all motions
at trial, whether or not offered in argument at the district court.68 It encompasses motions dismissed 69 or withdrawn-o and the facts surrounding those
motions. Contrary to the express language in Foley, the new definition also
73
includes the testimony of witnesses at trial, 7 jury instructions,72 depositions,
and expert testimony not used at trial. 74 The court has in addition examined
the record proper of the case and found conflict based on dictum in earlier
decisions. 75 Also included in the definition of record proper are the litigant's
often ample appendices attached to briefs for jurisdiction. The court has
examined these appendices and used "testimony and evidence in prior lawsuits as the source documents upon which to find direct conflict." '7 6 The
record proper giving rise to conflicts may also include the facts of a case
vested in the supreme court by article V of the Florida Constitution. See National Airlines
v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla. 1976) (England, J. dissenting); AB CTC v. Morejon,
324 So. 2d 625, 630 (Fla. 1975) (England, J. dissenting).
65. F.A.R. §4.5(C)(6) (1977).
66. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d at 642.
67. 177 So. 2d at 223.
68. Godstall v. Unigard, 225 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1971).
69. D'Agostiro v. State, 310 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 1975).
70. Lopez v. State, 300 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1974).
71. Commerce Nat'1 Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1973).
72. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 830-32 (Fla. 1970). The dissent, noting that
the use of the jury instruction relied on by the majority constituted harmless error,
accused the court of using this unimportant technicality of procedure as a pretense to
obtain conflict jurisdiction to address other issues on the merits.
73. Baycol Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451, 459 (Fla. 1975).
74. Noa v. United Gas Pipeline, 305 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1974).
75. Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Marietta, 197 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 1967). See also Sunad Inc. v.
City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960).
76. AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625, 629-30 (Fla. 1975).
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plus a dissenting opinion, ' although the court admits that by definition the
dissent is rebutted by the majority's judgment even when the majority does
not write an opinion. Perhaps the clearest infringement by the supreme
court on the district courts' final appellate jurisdiction by use of the record
proper has come in a series of cases in which the court has examined the
record to find a conflict based on misapplication or error assigned to the
M

district courts.7 9

Perhaps only an elastic definition of record proper can give the court the
perspective to determine whether or not a conflict exists. Perhaps also, the
court has found it necessary to the exercise of its conflict jurisdiction to
expand the definition of record proper to the above proportions better to
determine the relevant facts and issues in the absence of a district court
opinion1s But an unbroken line of dissenters has suggested that the expanding
record proper also provides a channel for a supreme court of limited power
to recoup some of its withdrawn jurisdiction.
Justice Thornal's dissent in Foley frowned on the majority's view that
the supreme court has "the power to examine the trial records to create a
conflict of decisions when a district court affirms without opinion.""s He asked
the court to "exercise extreme caution against reaching out beyond the
confines of the Constitution to endow the court with jurisdiction they do
not have."' 2 Justice Thornal found the harm of exercising this extraconstitutional jurisdiction to lie in a stripping of the district courts of their
final appellate jurisdiction. 83 The ultimate result of this lack of faith8 4 in
77. Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1975); Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins.
Co., 284 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1973); Smothers v. Smothers, 281 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973); Autrey
v. Carroll, 240 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1970); Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1963). Contra,
Golden Loaf Bakery v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976). In
Golden Loaf, although the majority seemed to adopt a case by case approach, Justice
England in his concurring opinion stated: "My principal objection to 'dissent conflict'
stems from my unwillingness to ascribe to the dissenter the power to speak for the
unspoken majority. In this case, for example, respondents vigorously contest the dissenter's
characterization of the majority's affirmance. . . . I would expressly overrule all cases
which hold than conflict jurisdiction may be premised on a dissenting opinion." Id. at
587. But see Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113, 116 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting).
78. Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co., 284 So. 2d at 207.
79. Killaren Apts. v. Estate of Thompson, 283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973); Fountainbleau,
Inc. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563, 566 (Fla. 1971). In Fountainbleau the dissent points to a
lengthy chain cite of cases that relied upon the post-1957 Constitution to characterize the
Supreme Court of Florida as a court of limited supervisory jurisdiction, not a court for
final review of trial error.
80. Interview with Justice James C. Adkins, Supreme Court of Florida, in Tallahassee,
Fla. (October 13, 1975). But see Buck v. Lopez, 250 So. 2d 6, 9 (Fla. 1971) (Adkins, J. dissenting).
81. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, 177 So. 2d 221, 234 (Fla. 1965).
82. Id. at 235.
83. Id. at 234.
84. Justice Thornal noted that "[i]f I were a practicing laryer in Florida, I would
never again accept with finality a decision of a district court. Under the majority decision
today, there is always that potential opportunity to obtain another examination of the
record by the supreme court with the hope that it will in some way differ with the district
court." Id.
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the district courts would be an increase in the number of cases urged upon
the supreme court,8 5 thereby returning its dock~ts to the state of chaos that
the 1957 amendment to Article V was designed to eliminate.8 Adding to the
fear of divesting the district courts of their final appellate authority was the
fulfillment of Justice Thornal's prediction that soon the concept of record
proper would be used to "go behind district court decisions rendered with
opinion."' 7 In Sinclair v. Butlerss the supreme court reversed a district
court's decision rendered with opinion by reviewing the record proper and
determining that the district court had overlooked a critical issue. 9 In
Sinclair, Justices Thornal and Thomas called on their judicial brethren to
define the limits of both record proper and the court's conflict jurisdiction;
however, no definition was forthcoming. In 1970, the court fulfilled another
of Justice Thornal's Sinclair predictions- when it extended the definition of
record proper to include review of the trial transcript in Gibson v. Maloney.91
In his dissent, Justice Ervin called for "some kind of forthright articulation
of the majority's reasoning for this further extension of Foley."92 Justice
Ervin characterized the majority's conflict as a bootstrapping process93 in
which the court used the alleged conflict not to harmonize the laws to the
state but rather to resolve a potential conflict of Florida law with prevailing
legal philosophies.94 Justice Thornal's dissent in Gibson began by classifying
the court's basis for conflict as harmless error. 95 He characterized the use of
such a conflict as a pretext for jurisdiction over the merits of the case.
It appears common law certiorari has returned. By allowing ourselves to examine the "record proper," including the "transcript of
testimony," this Court is able to completely circumvent any jurisdictional issue and go right to the merits of each case. If we think the
District Court of Appeal reached the wrong conclusion, the majority
mysteriously finds some conflict. I think it is plain to see why we are
receiving more and more petitions asking us to grant "conflict
certiorari." If an attorney will scream the merits of his case long and
85. See note 59 supra.
86. 177 So. 2d at 234-35. See Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 833 (Fla. 1970).
87. Id. at 234.
88. 190 So. 2d 313, 320 (Fla. 1966).
89. But cf. Register v. Gladding, 322 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1976). While review of district
court decisions rendered with opinions has been limited by Register, the full impact of
the opinion is still unclear. Justice England's language and the posture of the case allow

two possible interpretations. First, in the strictest sense, Register merely demands adherence
to the Foley rule that examination of lower court decisions by use of the record proper does
not allow review of the transcript of testimony in the trial court. This rule has not
been consistently followed. See notes 91-96 infra. Read more broadly, Register signals

an intention to overrule the procedure of using the record proper to go behind decisions
of the district courts rendered with an opinion.
90. See 190 So. 2d at 320.
91. 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970). But see Register v. Gladding, 322 So. 2d 911 (Fla.
1976). This holding seems to place a limit on the "reanalyzing of testimonial evidence to

establish constitutional 'conflict."' Id. at 912.
92. 231 So. 2d at 834.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 830-31.
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loud enough, he might always find a conflict somewhere in the "record
proper."96
Justice Thornal cited the increase in petitions and number of cases reviewed
on certiorari since Foley97 as proof that the Foley dissent's prediction that
the record proper concept would cause a flooding of the supreme court.
Justice Thornal's most forceful statement returned to the increasing effect
on the district courts of the court's pretextual use of record proper.
I predict that if the Court keeps finding "direct conflict" at the rate we
are moving, that in a relatively short time the District Court of Appeal
will cease to be courts of final jurisdiction as intended by our Constitution. .

.

. We are rapidly approaching the much decried allowance

of "two appeals," which concerned the framers of our amended
juridical article when it was drafted in 1956.
It will not be long before the entire purpose behind Fla. Const.
art. V, §4(2), [98] as it was amended in 1956, will be defeated. 99
Justice Thornal's fears in Gibson were echoed by Justice Drew in Fountainbleu Hotel v. Walters.100 In Walters, Justice Drew objected to the issuance
of a writ of conflict certiorari to review an alleged misapplication of law
based on a district court decision rendered without opinion. The majority
was reminded that the court is one of limited jurisdiction empowered to
"harmonize, not correct erroneous decisions of the [district courts]." 10 1
Although the expanded definition 10 2 of record proper is still the measure
of the court's conflict jurisdiction, recent decisions have manifested a resurgence of opposition to the Foley rule. In Baycol v. Downtown Development Authority, 0 3 Justice Overton dissented from the majority's use of a
portion of deposition testimony to create conflict. In calling for a new
definition of record proper, Justice Overton relied on Neilsen v. City of
°
Sarasota'"
to reiterate that the supreme court is not a court of selected
errors that can whimsically choose cases of importance for review. 05 Justice
96. Id. at 832-33.
97. Id. at 833.
98. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(3).
99. 231 So. 2d at 833.
100. 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971).
101. Id. at 566. Ironically, the majority of the court seems to parrot Justice Drew's
statement when it does not want to review a district court decision. Financial Fed. Savings
v. Burleigh House, 336 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Fla. 1976). This opinion has an unusual twist;
Justice England dissents claiming the supreme court should grant certiorari to resolve
"a potentially embarrassing conflict." Id. at 1147. For a further demonstration of the
courts move toward a narrower certiorari jurisdiction in a similar situation see Mystan
Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976) (when the district court denies
certiorari without an opinion the supreme court has no jurisdiction to determine if a
conflict exists, or whether certiorari was improperly denied).
102. But cf. Register v. Gladding, 322 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1976) (the real impact of this
decision, however, is not yet certain). See note 89 supra.
103. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
104. 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
105. Id. at 734.
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Overton, emphasizing the limited role of the Florida supreme court's conflict
jurisdiction, stated that conflict jurisdiction should be exercised only "to
stabilize the law by a review of decisions which form patently irreconciliable
012
precedents."'010 Justice Overton was not alone in advocating this philosophy.
In two recent dissenting opinions, Justice England voiced the need for a reevaluation of the court's use of record proper. In AB CTC v. Morejon,108
Justice England challenged the existence of a conflict based on evidence
and testimony from a different and prior lawsuito 9 because the court's exercise
of conflict jurisdiction did not in the case result in a harmonization of state
law."10 In State v. Embry,"' Justice England, pointing to the majority's
"glossing over of the jurisdictional question to get to the merits,""12 urged
the court to deny certiorari when there was no jurisdiction to consider the
merits: "A responsible exercise of our limited constitutional role requires
that we refrain from a review of district court decisions which, on their
face, either harmonize or apply existing precedents."" 3
Lack of predictability resulting from the unclear definition of record
proper combined with the unfavorable impact on the district courts of this
standard of review substantiate past and present fears about the workability
and constitutionality of using the record proper as the method for examining
district court decisions without opinion to determine whether the requirements for conflict certiorari have been met.

106. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
107. Justice England and Chief Justice Overton favor a limited supreme court review
by conflict certiorari with limited examinations of the record proper. Justices Boyd, Adkins,
and Roberts consistently vote for an expanded supreme court review by conflict certiorari.
While neither of the two newer Justices, Sundberg and Hatchett, has specifically addressed
this conflict, Justice Sunberg seems to be leaning toward the England-Overton view. See
Florida Publish. Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 920 (Fla. 1976). Justice Hatchett's
tendency to swing depending on the facts suggests that he employs a type of sliding scale
approach to conflict certiorari jurisdiction. If Justice Sunberg and Hatchett continue to
lean toward restricted jurisdiction, Foley may be overruled at any time. For an example
of the new majority in action see Golden Loaf Bakery v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co.,
334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976).
108. 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975).
109. Id. at 629.
110. Id. at 629-30.
111. 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975).
112. Id. at 519.
113. Id. There have been some moves toward constricting the supreme court's
conflict jurisdiction. Golden Loaf Bakery v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585,
586-87 (Fla. 1976) (dissenting opinions purporting to state the majority position as

grounds for conflict); Register v. Gladding, 322 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1976) (using record proper
to go behind decisions of the district courts rendered with an opinion). See also note
124 infra. Nevertheless, as of May 12, 1976, the court still seems to take cases beyond
their jurisdiction. In a case decided on this date, National Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d
545, 548 (Fla. 1976), Justice England stated in dissent: "I can only reiterate the warnings
of my predecessors that to so [take cases where no real conflict exists] is at odds with
a constitutional scheme which never contemplated that our district courts would be
treated as 'way stations' in a multiple appellate process. This case demonstrates the

majority's propensity to do just that."
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CONCLUSION: CLEARER LINES FOR A DEFINITION OF POWER

Any approach to solving the problems created by the Foley rule must
carefully balance the need for uniformity in the laws of the state, the possibility
of injustice to litigants arising from per curiam decisions, 114 and the adverse
impact of extended supreme court jurisdiction on the finality of district
court decisions.
The problem of circumventing or second guessing the district courts
could most easily be solved, short of a constitutional amendment, by requiring
a district court to write an opinion in every case or face remand for failure
to do so if the decision gives rise to a conflict. The problems with this procedure, however, include delay of final adjudication and the possibility of
placing the supreme court in the position of dealing with a district court
that refuses to write an opinion., 5 A procedure occasionally utilized is to
request the district court to send to the supreme court a copy of the district
court proceedings."16 Presently, however, different courts send different information and often the supreme court must make repeated requests for
the information desired." 7 The district courts could be more directly involved
by establishing a uniform procedure for the inclusion of the district court's
view in conflict certiorari proceedings." 8

114. There is a potential violation of equal protection at the district court level
if failure to write an opinion can be shown to prejudice or aid appellants in obtaining
review. Under Lake, for example, failure to write an opinion could have deprived a
litigant of even a possibility of review except in circumstances of extreme injustice. Interview with Justice B. K. Roberts, Supreme Court of Florida, in Tallahassee, Fla., (Oct. 13,
1975). Under Foley, an absence of opinion may prejudicially aid in obtaining review
by the supreme court.
115. The procedure of requiring the district courts to write an opinion was occasionally
used after Lake, see notes 5, 36 supra, but ultimately that produced the result in
Foley; that is, refusal by the district court to write an opinion. As noted by Justice
England, "Unlike our court, the district courts are required to accept appeals from all
litigated matters. In the nature of things they will receive a large number of cases which
routinely apply existing law to a variety of different facts. It seems to me obvious that there
are many cases which warrant no opinion decisions simply because they are routine.
This category of district court, cases can never provide conflict jurisdiction for us, and to
the extent that we tighten our notions of conflict, the district courts will be encouraged
to use no opinion decisions to handle this large and routine portion of their workload."
Letter from Justice A. England to Domenic L. Massari III, (Dec. 8, 1975), on file at
the University of Florida Law Review. The only possible danger in Justice England's
approach is the potential district court decision without opinion disobeying the express
authority of the supreme court. This type of decision would then be unreviewable even
though it flies in the face of precedent.
116. Interview with Chief Justice Ben Overton, Supreme Court of Florida in Tallahassee,
Fla. (Oct. 3, 1975).
117. Id.
118. See Appendix, especially provisions II(b) and III(a)(4)(b)(i) & (ii). It is clear
that the establishment of a uniform procedure would involve the expenditure of more
time at the district court level, but the district court system and the number of judges
can be expanded to solve the problem. Assuming good faith on the part of judges, the
most logical place to determine what factors are relevant to conflict is at the district court
level. The district court judges have read the briefs and heard the oral arguments. They
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The problem of an ever increasing number of detailed and lengthy
petitions for certiorari"19 is in need of immediate solution as consideration
of such petitions is absorbing an inordinately large percentage of the supreme
court's time. In contrast to the procedure for determining conflict between
regular court opinions, significantly greater numbers of hours are needed to
analyze petitions based on per curiam district court decisions because only
the record proper provides a basis for determining if a conflict exists. 20 The
court, by denying certiorari if a petitioner does not carefully isolate support
for the conflict, could halt the fishing expedition approach 12 employed by
many appellate practitioners. An effective solution would be a supreme court
opinion on record proper delimiting not only the proper contents of a brief
for certiorari but also the degree of specificity to be demonstrated before the
court will accept supportive information as "necessary to establish conflict."'122
An improved definition of "necessary to establish jurisdiction" might reduce
the volume of marginally relevant data urged on the court as the basis for a
conflict. In addition, this definition should be codified in an amendment
to the appellate rules that enunciates with specificity the appropriate requirements of a brief on jurisdiction.123 Such an explicit definition of record
proper would allow presentation of a finalized and dear picture of conflict
appropriate for supreme court consideration on the issue of jurisdiction.
The final problem created by Foley, expansion of supreme court jurisdiction to the extent that it interferes with the final appellate jurisdiction of the
district courts, is one that can be solved only by the court's careful reexamination of its constitutional role. 2 4 Only Florida's supreme court possesses
can select what is appropriate and what is not for the supreme court to consider as
"that part of the record necessary to establish [conflict] jurisdiction." F.A.R. §4.5(c)(6) (1977).
119. See notes 54-62 supra.

120. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 64 supra:
122.

F.A.R. §4.5(c)(6). See also, proposed F.A.R. §9.28; note 61 supra. "This approach

would also be considerably less costly to the litigants, and we should ever be mindful of
the costs of operating our system for those who use it." Letter from Justice A. England to
Domenic L. Massari HI (Dec. 8, 1975) on file at the University of Florida Law Review.
123. The proposed amendments to the FLoRIDA APPELLATE RULES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
CuRTroRuu are silent on most of these points. The proposed amendments consolidate the
petition for certiorari with the brief for jurisdiction, prevent application for a writ to

act as a stay in any proceedings, and finally expedite the time pending for a writ of
certiorari to be acted on. Though helpful, these changes neither address the core of
the record proper problem nor provide guidelines for conflict jurisdiction. Most important,
the amendments provide no criteria for treatment of district court decisions rendered
without opinion. Proposed F.A.R. §9.280 note 61 supra.
124. Recent opinions indicate that the court is narrowing its conflict jurisdiction.
Golden Loaf Bakery v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976); Wilson v.
Southern Bell Tel. Co., 327 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1976); Southeast Title Co. v. Caldwell, 326
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1976); Register v. Gladding, 322 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1976); Mahler v. Lauderdale
Lakes Nat'l Bank, 322 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1976). Cf. National Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d
545, 547-48 (Fla. 1976). Also, the author's tabulations for January through March, 1976,

show a decrease in the number of conflict certiorari cases heard by the court. Out of 55
reported cases of certiorari heard from January to March, the court has entertained only

34 cases on the basis of conflict. Of these, eight have been dismissed as not containing
conflict after the filing of briefs and/or oral arguments, eight have been dismissed pursuant
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the ability to define the limits of its own power.1 25 A rejection of all cases
in which a district court does not write an opinion cannot adequately protect
the constitutional goal of harmonizing the laws of the state, but the need for
harmonization should not open the doors to unqualified review of any case
the supreme court finds to be of great interest from a review of the record
proper. The standard of review selected by the court should protect against
review of the merits before determination of jurisdictional competence. At
present, the only effective protection that the court can employ against a
petitioner's premature exhibition of the merits is a strict enforcement of
the phrase "only that part necessary to establish [conflict]" as set out in
the present Florida rules of appellate practice.1 26 A more workable alternative
would be the careful limitation of the record of conflict presentable to the
court. 2 7 A precise definition of record proper would enhance the supreme
court's performance of its supervisory function of harmonizing the laws of
the state without adversely affecting the final appellate jurisdiction of the
district courts of appeal.
Solutions to these problems are urgently needed. In dealing with per
curiam determinations in the future and ultimately disposing of Foley,
the Supreme Court of Florida must give due consideration to both constitutional and practical questions. The most desirable resolution encompasses
cooperation among state courts, not isolationism. Only such cooperation can
meet the ultimate goal of any legal system: a swift, consistent, and workable
dispensing of justice.
DOMENIC L. MASSARI, III

APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO §4.5 RULES OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE*
I.

GROUNDS FOR CONFLICT CERTIORARI

Supreme court review by conflict certiorari may be based only on the following
grounds:
A. Showing conflict is of the nature that failure to harmonize conflict will result
in inconsistent and confused decisions on this point of law, or
B. Showing an adverse factual impact on the immediate litigant is directly caused
by the conflict alleged.
I.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONFLICT

All petitions for conflict certiorari must demonstrate that the decision of the district
to a recent supreme court decision, and only 18 have actually been heard and decided
on the merits of conflict. Compare the 1976 figures with 128 cases heard and decided
on the basis of conflict in 1975.
125. Contra, Esteva v. Adkins, No. 75-215 (N.D. Fla., filed Dec. 1976). This suit
alleges an abuse of the Florida supreme court's conflict jurisdiction and asks the federal
court to determine the limits of the supreme court's conflict power.
126. F.A.R. §4.5(c)(6) (1977).
127. See Appendix infra.
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NEW CRITERIA FOR CONFLICT CERTIORARI
court of appeal creates a conflict with the decision of another district court of
appeal or the supreme court on a point of law by showing:
A. A conflict on the face of the district court opinion, or
B. If the district court decision is made without opinion, by disposition of a
petition for rehearing, filed with the district court, based on grounds of conflict
petitioner offers as grounds for certiorari.

I.

BuRmFs
A. A petitioner's brief offered in support of the court's conflict jurisdiction will

contain only:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Grounds of conflict alleged.
Citation of authority giving rise to conflict.
Discussion of existence and impact of alleged conflict.
An attached copy of the "record proper" concerning the subject matter of
the conflict from:
a. Opinion of the district court.
b. If no opinion, then:
i. District court evaluation of the conflict from opinion on petition for
rehearing.
ii. If no rehearing granted or opinion filed on grounds of conflict in
disposition of rehearing, a certified copy of the "record proper," on
point of law in conflict, from the district court.
B. A reply brief on jurisdiction will be limited to the same matters appropriate for
petitioners brief as described in (A.) of this section.
*This proposal could also replace (c)(2) of proposed F.A.R. §9.280 (Sept. 1976 draft), or
could be formulated into a constitutional amendment to article V, §3(b)(3).
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